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Are All Contracts of Employment Exempt
From the Provisions of the
Federal Arbitration Act? The Supreme
Court Settles the Matter
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams t

I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Ace ("FAA") in 1925 to reverse
the longstanding hostility of courts toward agreements to arbitrate and to make
such agreements specifically enforceable? Section 1 of the FAA exempts the
employment contracts of "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" from the Act's coverage.4
The breadth of that exemption has been an issue with the courts of appeals for
the past six decades, with the overwhelming majority of courts holding that
Section 1 exempts only the contracts of employment of transportation workers
from the FAA.'
In Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.,6 the Ninth Circuit went against this
authority and held that Section 1 excluded all contracts of employment from the
terms of the FAA.' It applied this holding in CircuitCity Stores, Inc. v. Adams,8
the appeal of which brought the issue to the Supreme Court. Directly
considering the issue for the first time, a divided Court agreed with the majority
of the courts of appeals and held that Section 1 excludes only the employment
contracts of transportation workers.9 This Note argues that any ambiguity in the

1. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).

3. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. ofAm., 350 U.S. 198,211 n.5 (1956) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
4. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835-37 (8th Cir.
1997); Prynerv. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354,358 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,522
U.S. 912 (1997); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers
of Am., 235 F.2d 298,302-03 (2d Cir. 1956), overruledon other grounds by Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812 Int'l Bhd., 242
F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of
Am. (U.E.), Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953).
6. 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998), overruledby Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
7. ld. at 1094.
8. 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
9. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 119.
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language of the exemption is only the result of the Court's expansion of
Congress' Commerce Clause power, and that, faced with two arguably valid
approaches, the Court chose the approach most consistent with its recent
jurisprudence and which is potentially of benefit to both employers and
employees.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In October 1995, Saint Clair Adams applied for a job with Circuit City
Stores, Inc., a national retailer of consumer electronics.10 Like all Circuit City
applicants," included in Adams' application was a document entitled "Circuit
City Dispute Resolution Agreement."' 2 The agreement required Adams to
arbitrate any employment-related disputes that might arise with Circuit City. 3
The application further stated that "Circuit City will not consider [the
applicant's] application unless [the arbitration] agreement is signed."' 4 Adams
signed the agreement and was nired as a sales counselor at Circuit City's store
in Santa Rosa, California.' Adams resigned from Circuit City in November
19966 and subsequently filed an employment discrimination claim in state court
against Circuit City and three of his supervisors claiming that he was subjected
to harassment and retaliation because of his sexual orientation. 7 Circuit City
then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, making a motion to enjoin the state court proceedings and to compel
arbitration ofAdams' claims pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 8
Adams opposed the motion on several grounds, including that the arbitration

10. Id. at 109. Circuit City is a Virginia corporation with retail stores throughout
the United States. Brief for Respondent at 1.

11. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
12. Circuit City Stores, 194 F.3d at 1071.
13. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 109-10. Specifically, a portion of the
agreement provides: "I agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted claims,

disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for
employment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City, exclusively
by final and binding arbitrationbefore a neutral Arbitrator." Id. at 109-10.
14. Joint Appendix at 12.
15. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 110.

16. Brief for Petitioner at 5.
17. Brief for Respondent at 1. Adams' claims were based on the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 12940 (West 1992 and Supp.
2002), and other tort theories under California law. CircuitCity Stores, 532 U.S. at 110.
18. CircuitCity Stores, 532 U.S. at 110. Circuit City also motioned the district
court for Rule 11 sanctions. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. C98-0365 CAL,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6215, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 105
(2001); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/6
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agreement was an unconscionable contract of adhesion and lacking in
mutuality. 9 Adams did not argue to the district court, however, that the FAA
did not apply to his arbitration agreement with Circuit City.2" Noting the strong
state and federal policy favoring arbitration, the district court rejected Adams'
arguments and granted Circuit City's motion."'
Adams appealed to the Ninth Circuit.' While Adams' case was pending,
the Ninth Circuit decided Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., in which it held,
contrary to every other circuit to consider the issue, that Section 1 of the FAA,
which exempts "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,"24 exempts all
contracts of employment from the Act's coverage.' In the present case, the
Ninth Circuit applied its decision in Craftand reversed the district court, holding
that because the FAA did not apply to contracts ofemployment the district court
26
lacked authority to compel arbitration.
The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 ruling.27 The Court held that Section
1 of the FAA only excludes employment contracts of transportation workers
2
from the provisions of the FAA. 1

19. Brief for Respondent at 2, Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 991379).
20. Brief for Petitioner at 6.
21. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. C98-0365 CAL, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6215, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
22. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 110.
23. 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998), overruledby Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).

25. Craft, 177 F.3d at 1094.
26. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd,
532 U.S. 105 (2001). Circuit City argued unsuccessfully to the Ninth Circuit that the
arbitration agreement with Adams was not a contract of employment because the
agreement expressly disclaimed it as such. Brief for Petitioner at 7, CircuitCity Stores,
532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379). Circuit City made the same argument to the
Supreme Court in its certiorari petition, but the Court declined to hear that issue. Id. The
treatment of employment arbitration agreements which disclaim that they are contracts
of employment raises interesting issues, and courts considering the matter have reached
differing conclusions. See infra note 44.
27. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 124. Circuit City's success at the Supreme

Court was short-lived. On remand, the Ninth Circuit found the "Dispute Resolution
Agreement" an unconscionable contract of adhesion and again reversed the district
court's order compelling arbitration of Adams's claims. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892-95 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2329 (2002).
28. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 119.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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IT. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The United States Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
in 1925.? Its purpose in passing the Act was to overcome the longstanding
hostility ofAmerican courts toward agreements to arbitrate.30 That hostility was
noted by the Supreme Court inRed Cross Line v. AtlanticFruitCo.3' a year prior

to the FAA's enactment. In Red CrossLine, the Supreme Court considered the
Arbitration Law ofNew York, 2 a law which served as the model for the FAA.33
The Court explained that agreements to arbitrate were limited by the courts'
refusal to specifically enforce them, to allow them to be plead as a bar to an
action, and to allow them to support a motion to stay a court action.34 "The
federal courts-like those of the states and England," the Court noted, "have,
both in equity and at law, denied, in large measure, the aid of their processes to
those seeking to enforce executory agreements to arbitrate disputes. 35
In order to overcome that hostility, the FAA made written arbitration
agreements specifically enforceable 36 and gave courts and aggrieved parties
power to take action against those who failed to comply with their own
arbitration agreements.37
Section 2 of the FAA explains the Act's scope and provides that "[a]
written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy [arising out
of such a contract] ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 3

29. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000). At the time of its passage
the Act was referred to as the "United States Arbitration Act." David Sherwyn, J. Bruce
Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of MandatoryArbitration ofEmployment Disputes:
Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the
Process,2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 102 n.131 (1999).

30. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n.5 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). This hostility has been traced to the courts of England and
the efforts of those courts to expand their jurisdiction while at the same time opposing
"anything that would altogether deprive every one of them ofjurisdiction," in particular,
agreements to arbitrate. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
31. 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
32. Currently N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501-14 (1997 & Supp. 2001).
33. Nicholas J. Healy, An Introductionto the FederalArbitrationAct, 13 J. MAR.
L. &CoM. 223, 223 (1982).
34. Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 118 (1924).
35. Id. at 120-21.

36. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
37. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (2000).

38. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Grounds for the revocation of any contract would include,
for example, fraud, duress, or mistake. See RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/6
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Section 3 requires a court to stay any action which involves an issue subject
to an arbitration agreement until the issue has been arbitrated.39 Section 4 makes
arbitration agreements specifically enforceable, providing that a party "aggrieved
by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate" under a written
arbitration agreement may petition a United States district court for an order
directing the party in default to "proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the [arbitration] agreement."'
Section 1 defines "maritime transactions" and "commerce" under the Act4 '
and concludes by stating that nothing in the FAA shall apply to "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class or workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."42 This exemption from the FAA's
coverage has been a source of dispute for the past six decades. The principal
questions have been what constitutes a "contract of employment" under the Act
and what is the extent of "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce"? The Supreme Court decided the latter issue in Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.43

What constitutes a "contract of employment" under the Act first became an
issue with regard to the collective bargaining agreements of unions and their
members.' During the 1940s and 1950s, a number of the federal circuit courts
CONTRACTS § 1:20, at 49-50 (4th ed. 1990).

39. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). Section 3 also provides, however, that the party
requesting the stay must not be in default in proceeding with the arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §
3 (2000).
40. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). Sections 3 and 4 were the basis for Circuit City's suit in
the federal district court. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. C98-0365 CAL,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6215, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 105
(2001).
41. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
42. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
43. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
44. More recently, it has also become an issue in the non-union context with regard
to employment-related documents such as employment applications and employee
handbooks that contain an arbitration provision but expressly disclaim that they are a
contract of employment. See Stuart H. Bompey, Michael Delikat & Lisa K. McClelland,
The Attack on ArbitrationandMediation ofEmployment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 53
(1997). In Brown v. KFC National Management Co., the Supreme Court of Hawaii

found an arbitration agreement enforceable, even though it was contained in an
employment application that expressly disclaimed that it was a contract of employment.
921 P.2d 146, 148 (Haw. 1996). Conversely, the Michigan Supreme Court, in
Heurtebise v. Reliable Business Computers, found that an arbitration provision in an

employee handbook expressly stating that it did not create a contract of employment was
not enforceable. 550 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Mich. 1996). The Michigan court said that
because the employer did not intend to be bound by the provisions of the handbook it
could not enforce the arbitration agreement. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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considered that issue, with the Third, Fourth, and Fifth circuits holding that
collective bargaining agreements are contracts of employment within the FAA,"
while the First and Sixth circuits held that they are not.' The issue was largely
mooted by the Supreme Court's opinion in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln

Mills of Alabama,47 in which the Court authorized the creation of a body of
federal common law of labor arbitration under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act.48 While some of these cases alluded to the second
question posed by Section 1 of the FAA-the breadth of the exemption for
workers "engaged in commerce"-none of the cases squarely addressed the
issue. Some courts such as the Fourth Circuit simply concluded that the FAA
did not apply to any contracts of employment.4 9
Tenney Engineering,Inc. v. United ElectricalRadio & Machine Workers
ofAmerica, Local 4370 was the first case to address squarely the breadth of the

Section 1 exemption. Tenney Engineering filed suit against the defendant union
for breach of contract alleging that the union had violated the parties' collective
bargaining agreement by striking. 1 Pursuant to Section 3 of the FAA, the union
moved the trial court to stay the proceedings until the parties had arbitrated the
matter.5" The issue before the Third Circuit was whether Section 3 applied to the
parties' collective bargaining agreement, which the court said in turn depended
upon "the construction which is to be placed" upon the exemption clause in
Section l." According to the majority, the issue was whether the exemption
clause was "intended to include only those employees actually engaged in the
channels of interstate or foreign commerce or did it comprehend all those

45. See Lincoln Mills of Ala. v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir.
1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Amalgamated Ass'n St. Elec. Ry.
& Motor Coach Employees, Local 1210 v. Penn. Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310, 313

(3d Cir. 1951); Int'l Union United Furniture Workers of Am. v. Colonial Hardwood
Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1948).
46. See Local 205, United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233

F.2d 85, 100 (1st Cir. 1956), aft'd, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Hoover Motor Express Co. v.
Teamsters, Local Union No. 327, 217 F.2d 49, 52-53 (6th Cir. 1954).
47. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).

48. Id. at 453-57; see Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1994); Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law ofLaborArbitration
and CommercialArbitration: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 BAYLORL. REV. 781,
894-99 (2000).
49. See Int 7 Union UnitedFurnitureWorkers, 168 F.2d at 36. "Labor contracts
are specifically excluded from the federal arbitration act." Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil

Workers Int'l Union, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951).
50. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
51. Id. at 451.
52. Id.
53. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/6
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engaged in activities affecting such commerce, such as the production of goods
destined for sale in it?"5'
After noting the sparseness of the legislative history on the point, the court
mentioned objections to the bill made by Andrew Furuseth, the president of the
International Seamen's Union of America, who argued that the wages ofseamen
were within admiraltyjurisdiction and should notbe subject to arbitration. 5 The
court then explained that the drafters of the FAA had chosen to exempt seamen
as well as railroad employees, both of which were classes of workers "engaged
directly in interstate or foreign commerce."'56 The Tenney court then stated that
the phrase "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" was intended by Congress to be interpreted under the rule of
ejusdem generis,57 "to include only those workers who are actually engaged in
the movement of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related
thereto as to be in practical effect part of it.""8 Thus, the court concluded that the
Section 1 exemption extended only to the contracts of workers engaged in the
transportation industry.
In arriving at its decision, the Tenney court noted that "[i]t must be
remembered that the Arbitration Act of 1925 was drawn and passed at a time
when the concept of Congressional power over individuals whose activities
affected interstate commerce had not developed to the extent to which it was
'
expanded in the succeeding years."59
The court concluded that Tenney's
employees, who were engaged in the production of goods for subsequent sale,
while undoubtedly affecting interstate commerce, were not directly involved in
the "channels" of commerce itself, that is, they were not involved in
transportation, and, therefore, their collective bargaining agreement was not
included in the Section 1 exemption.'

54. Id. at 452.
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. Ejusdem generis is "[a] canon of construction that when a general word or
phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will be
interpreted to include only persons or things of the same type as those listed." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 535 (7th ed. 1999).
58. Tenney Eng'g,Inc. v. UnitedElec. Radio & Mach. Workers ofAm., Local 437,

207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953).
59. Id. at 453.
60. Id. The majority distinguished its decision in Tenney from its decisions in
Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of
America, Local Division 1210v. PennsylvaniaGreyhoundLines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.
1951) (Greyhound I), and PennsylvaniaGreyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Association
of Street,Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees ofAmerica, Division 1063, 193
F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952) (Greyhound II) by explaining that in those cases the bus line

employees were directly engaged in interstate transportation. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 453.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge McLaughlin criticized the majority's narrow
reading of the Section 1 exemption and argued that the better reading was a
broad one exempting all contracts of employment."' Judge McLaughlin argued
that the legislative history showed that the FAA was enacted to "provide solely
for arbitration in commercial disputes" and was not intended to apply to labor at
all.62 Therefore, the majority's use of ejusdem generis in construing Section 1
was misapplied because it would "defeat the obvious purpose" of the FAA.63
Finally, Judge McLaughlin noted that construing Section 1 "[tlo suggest that the
1925 concept of interstate commerce should restrict the exclusionary language
of the Act in 1953 is unrealistic."'"
Tenney was followed by the Fourth Circuit Court's decision in United
Electrical,Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Miller Metal Products,
Inc.65 The Fourth Circuit stated that it was "not impressed" by the Third
Circuit's holding in Tenney." The court stated that when Congress enacted the
FAA, it had intended to exercise the full extent of its Commerce power.67 Like
the dissent in Tenney, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the contracts of
employment exemption in Section 1 should also reach to the full extent of the
Commerce power, and, thus, the exemption would apply to all contracts of
employment."' The court limited its holding, however, to the collective
bargaining context.69
Two years later, the Second Circuit added its voice to the debate in SignalStat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of
America.70 In this case, the court agreed with both the decision and reasoning

61. Id. at 455 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 458 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting) (quoting Gooch v. United States, 297
U.S. 124, 128 (1936)).
64. Id. (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). "[E]ven if it be agreed, as it must be, that the
concept ofinterstate commerce was much narrower then than now, we need not be bound
by the older view." Id. (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
65. 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954). Like Tenney, Miller MetalProductsconsidered
the Section 1 exemption in the context of a collective bargaining agreement which the
court concluded was excluded from the FAA by the Section 1 exclusion for "contracts
of employment." 1d. at 224.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. Even so, the court's reasoning would seem to apply to individual contracts
as well. See id.
70. 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957), overruledon
other grounds by Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers
Union Local 812 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 242 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001). Signal-Stat, like
Tenney and Miller Metal Products, involved a collective bargaining agreement rather
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/6
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of Tenney." Adding to Tenney's reasoning, the court referred to "the present,
almost universal," approval of arbitration and stated that a construction
exempting only transportation workers was in accord with that approval as well
as supporting what the court deemed to be the intention of Congress in enacting
the FAA.

72

Following Signal-Stat, the courts of appeals were silent on the issue for
almost a decade, until the Seventh Circuit decided Pietro Scalzitti Co. v.
InternationalUnion of OperatingEngineers, Local No. 150. Referring to
Tenney and Signal-Stat, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Section 1
exemption applied only to transportation workers, and, thus, the parties'
collective bargaining agreement fell within the scope of the FAA. 4
Six years later, in Dickstein v. duPont,the First Circuit reached the same
conclusion regarding the breadth ofthe Section 1 exemption.75 The First Circuit
summarily rejected the argument ofDickstein, a stockbroker for duPont, that he
fell within the Section 1 exemption. 6 Citing Tenney and Signal-Stat,the First
Circuit determined that the exemption was limited to employees involved in or
related to the actual movement of goods."
The Second Circuit then had the opportunity to revisit the issue in Erving
v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club.7 1 Citing Tenney and its own decision in
Signal-Stat, and noting the recent decision in Dickstein, the Second Circuit

than an individual contract of employment. See id.
71. Id. at 302-03. The court also referred to its interpretation of "workers" as used
in Section 1 of the FAA in Bernhardtv. PolygraphicCo. ofAmerica. See Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948,951-52 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'don othergrounds,
350 U.S. 198 (1956). In dicta, the court stated that the plaintiff in Bernhardt,a plant
superintendent with managerial duties and a $15,000 annual salary (in 1955), was not a
"worker" under the FAA. Id.
72. Signal-Stat, 235 F.2d at 302-03.
73. 351 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965).
74. Id. at 579-80. The court did not mention the Fourth Circuit's decision to the

contrary in United Electrical,Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Miller Metal
Products,Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954). The Seventh Circuit reiterated this holding

in MillerBrewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir.
1984).
75. 443 F.2d 783 (lst Cir. 1971). Unlike theprevious circuit cases considering the
Section 1 exemption, Dickstein involved an individual contract of employment rather
than a collective bargaining agreement. See id.
76. Id. at 785.
77. Id.
78. 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972). This case arose from the departure ofbasketball
great Julius Erving (a.k.a. "Dr. J") from the Virginia Squires to play for the Atlanta
Hawks. Id. at 1067. Like Dickstein, Erving considered an individual contract of
employment rather than a collective bargaining agreement. See id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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reaffirmed its holding that the Section 1 exemption applied only to transportation
workers.79 Thus, after Dickstein, the First, Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits
had all limited the exemption to transportation workers, and the Fourth Circuit
had held that the exemption applied to all contracts of employment, but limited
its holding to the collective bargaining context. The issue would not arise again
in the courts of appeals for over a decade.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates0

followed in the wake ofseveral Supreme Court decisions regarding other aspects
of the FAA but not reaching the scope of the Section 1 exemption." Asplundh
considered an employment contract between Asplundh Tree Expert Company
("Asplundh") and Bates, an employee.82 The contract contained an arbitration
provision calling for the arbitration of any dispute arising from the parties'
contract. 3 When Asplundh filed suit against Bates in federal district court, Bates
demanded arbitration of Asplundh's claims.8 4 Relying on the Sixth Circuit
decision in Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 8 the district judge concluded

that all employment contracts were exempt from the FAA. 6
On appeal, Asplundh argued that the arbitration clause was unenforceable
because it was contained in a contract of employment." The court began its
consideration ofthis argument by discussing the Willis decision, relied on by the
district court, in which another panel of the Sixth Circuit stated that Congress
intended to exclude all employment contracts from the FAA. 8 The Asplundh

79. Id. at 1069.
80. 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995).
81. See infra notes 256-62. In Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., the

majority recognized the Section 1 issue in a footnote but declined to address it. 500 U.S.
20,25 n.2 (1991). Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the Court should have
addressed the issue and argued at length for a broad reading of Section I to exempt all
contracts of employment. See id. at 36-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Asplundh, 71 F.3d at 593. The complete underlying facts are considerably
more complicated. See id. at 593-94.
83. Id. at 593.
84. Id.

85. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
86. Asplundh, 71 F.3d at 594. The district judge initially granted Bates' motion to
compel arbitration and denied Asplundh's motion for a preliminary injunction to stay
arbitration. Id. After Asplundh filed an appeal of the district court's order, the district
court took note of Willis v. Dean Witter and, concluding that all contracts ofemployment
were exempt from the FAA, invited Asplundh to dismiss its appeal, which Asplundh
declined to do. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 596-97.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/6
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court concluded that the statement in Willis was dicta which it was not required
to follow.8 9

The Asplundh court then reviewed the previous decisions considering the
breadth of the Section 1 exemption, stating that it was "incline[d] to agree" with
the decision and reasoning of Tenney that limited the exemption to the
employment contracts of transportation workers.90 Such an interpretation, the
court reasoned, comported with the language of the FAA and the "apparent
intent" of Congress in enacting it.9' This intent was illustrated by the difference
between the broad language in Section 2 defining the Act's coverage and the
narrower language of Section 1. The court concluded by stating that a narrow
interpretation of the Section 1 exemption was consistent with the FAA's policy
favoring arbitration and the Supreme Court's "clear disposition" to expand the
Act's application. 93
Soon after Asplundh, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue in Rojas v. TK
Communications, Inc.,9 and also concluded that Section 1 should be given a
narrow reading, limiting the exemption to transportation workers. 9 Reasoning
that if Congress had intended to exempt all contracts of employment, it could
have expressly done so, the court stated that "it is quite impossible to apply a
broad meaning to the term 'commerce' in Section 1 and not rob the rest of the
exclusion clause of all significance."'
The D.C. Circuit considered the issue for the first time and reached the
same conclusion in Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services. 7 The court
supported its conclusion with two canons of statutory interpretation.9" The first
canon relied on was that a court should avoid reading statutory language in a
way that makes some words in the statute completely redundant." Thus, the
court would not read "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" to exempt all contracts of employment, because doing so would
make the inclusion of seamen and railroad employees unnecessary." The court

89. Id. at 597.

90. See id. at 597-600.
91. Id. at 601.
92. Id. "[H]ad Congress intended the exclusion to be as broad as the coverage, it
would have used the same language in the exclusion clause." Id.

93. Id.
94. 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996).
95. Id. at 748.

96. Id. (quoting Albert v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 874 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (S.D.
Fla. 1995)).
97. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
98. Id. at 1470.

99. Id.
100. Id.
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also relied on the canon of ejusdem generis, as the Third Circuit had in Tenney,
concluding that "any other class 0of workers" only included workers similar to
seamen and railroad employees.' '
Beyond the canons, the Cole court noted that its decision was supported by
the decisions of the other circuits reaching the same conclusion. 2 Further, the
court noted the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court inAllied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson"°3 between the meanings of "involving commerce" used in
Section 2 of the FAA and "in commerce" used in Section 1.1°4 "Involving
commerce" extends to the limits of the Commerce Clause and is broader than "in.
commerce."' 5 The court stated that it recognized, as Justice Stevens had argued
in his Gilmer dissent, 6 that the legislative history of the Section 1 exemption
could be read to indicate Congress intended to exempt all contracts of
employment. 07 Nevertheless, because the statute was unambiguous and the case
law was "clear" on the meaning of the0exemption, "legislative history is, at best,
secondary, and, at worst, irrelevant."'
°9
The Seventh Circuit revisited the issue in Pryner v. TractorSupply Co.

In an opinion by Judge Posner, the court noted the argument of Professor
Matthew Finkin that the legislative history showed Congress' intent to exclude
all employment contracts." 0 The court further noted, however, that the
"impetus" for the exemption came from the seafarer's union and that seamen and
railroad employees were, at the time the FAA was enacted, already heavily
regulated by federal law."' Although motor carriers were not yet heavily
regulated by federal law, the court reasoned it may have seemed at the time that
they would also eventually be similarly regulated." 2 The Seventh Circuit felt
that this history supported, rather than undermined, limiting the exemption to
transportation workers." 3 Finally, the court noted that "[t]o impress the modem

101. Id. at 1471.
102. Id.
103. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
104. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1471-72.

105. Id. at 1472.
106. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,36 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
107. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1472.
108. Id.
109. 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 912 (1997).
110. Id. at 359; see generally Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under
the UnitedStates ArbitrationAct: An Essay in HistoricalClarification,17 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996).

111. Pryner, 109 F.3d at 358.
112. Id.

113. Id.
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meaning" of commerce on that word in the exemption would make the specific
inclusion of "seamen" and "railroad employees" superfluous and would give the
exemption "a breathtaking scope.""' 4 Such an interpretation would make an
arbitration clause in an employment agreement between "a giant multinational
corporation and its chief executive officer" unenforceable in federal court."'
Within little more than a year, the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
addressed the Section 1 issue for the first time, and each of those courts also
16
concluded that Section 1 exempted only transportationworkers from the FAA.'
In a footnote in its O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hospitalopinion, the Fourth Circuit
noted the apparent conflict with its earlier decision in MillerMetal Products,,"
but stated that the new decision was not to the contrary."8 "To begin with,
[Miller Metal Products] predates the substantial body of Supreme Court
precedent supporting utilization of the arbitration process. Even if we were to
assume that Miller Metal Products had any remaining vitality, however, it
clearly does not apply to individual employment contracts."'" 9
Thus, after the Tenth Circuit decided McWilliams in 1998, the First,
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits had all
considered the scope of the FAA Section 1 exemption, and all of those circuits
had concluded that only the employment contracts of transportation workers
were exempt from the Act's coverage. The Fourth Circuit had reached the same
conclusion for individual contracts of employment, although arguably it still held
all collective bargaining agreements exempt from the FAA, a holding which it
had strongly questioned in O'Neil. The other circuits had not considered the
issue, nor had the Supreme Court.
The next circuit to consider the Section 1 exemption was the Ninth Circuit
in Craftv. Campbell Soup Co.120 In this case, the court ruled, in a 2-1 opinion,
that all contracts of employment were exempt from the FAA. 2 ' The dispute
before the court arose from a non-discrimination provision in a collective
bargaining agreement between Craft's union and Campbell Soup, Craft's

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1998); O'Neil
v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare,
Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835-37 (8th Cir. 1997).
117. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc.,
215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954); see supranotes 65-69.
118. O'Neil, 115 F.3d at 274 n.l.
119. Id.
120. 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
121. See id. at 1094.
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employer.' 22 The provision provided that disputes arising under it would be
subject to a "grievance and arbitration procedure. '' "n
Craft filed a grievance alleging, inter alia, racial discrimination. 24 His
grievance was not resolved and was eventually referred to arbitration.'" In the
meantime, Craft filed suit in district court alleging claims under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other state law claims.'2 6 The district court granted
summary judgment for Campbell Soup on the state law claims, but did
not grant
27
summary judgment compelling arbitration of the Title VII claims.'
The Ninth Circuit determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
Campbell Soup's interlocutory appeal unless the FAA and its interlocutory
appeal provision'2 8 applied to Craft's collective bargaining agreement. 29 Thus,
the court determined that the issue was whether the FAA applied to employment
contracts at all. 30
The court noted that two interpretations were given to the Section 1
exemption: one holding that Congress did not intend for the FAA to apply to
any employment contracts and the other holding that Congress intended for the
FAA to apply to all employment contracts, except for the contracts of employees
actually transporting people or goods in interstate commerce.'
The Ninth
Circuit stated that courts following the second view were applying a
contemporary meaning to the terms used in the FAA, whereas a true
understanding of Congress' intent could only come from an understanding of the
commerce power as it was known when the FAA was enacted in 1925.132
Quoting Hammer v. Dagenhart3 3 the court illustrated that, at the time,
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause extended "to interstate
transportation, [and] its incidents," but not to the mere production of goods, even
122. Id. at 1084.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that "[b]oth parties assume that Campbell Soup's
motion for summaryjudgment was a defacto petition under 9 U.S.C. § 4 for an order to
compel arbitration. Although Campbell Soup's motion does not mention this section, we

agree that it was functionally equivalent to a motion to compel arbitration." Id. at 1084
n.4.
128. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) (2000). Specifically, the section provides that an
appeal may be taken from an order denying a petition under Section 4 of the FAA. 9
U.S.C § 16(a)(1)(B) (2000).
129. Craft, 177 F.3d at 1085.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1086.
133. 247 U.S. 251,272 (1918).
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though intended for interstate commerce. 3 4 Similarly then, Congress'
Commerce Clause power in 1925 was limited to employees transporting people
or goods in interstate commerce.'35 Thus, when Congress drafted Section 2,
extending the scope of the FAA to "any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce,"'35 it only had the power to reach
those kinds of employees.'37 The court reasoned, however, that Congress then
exempted those same employees in Section 1.111
The court next turned to the legislative history of the FAA, stating that the
history demonstrated that the purpose of the Act was solely to bind merchants
in commercial dealings. 39 The court noted the Senate committee hearing
testimony ofW.H.H. Piatt, the chair ofthe American Bar Association committee
that drafted the bill that became the FAA. 4 ' When some voiced concern that the
bill would apply to workers' contracts, Piatt had said it was not intended "that
this shall be an act referring to labor disputes at all."'' Further, the Secretary of
Commerce, Herbert Hoover, had told the same committee that to ensure that
employment contracts were excluded from the FAA, the phrase "but nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce" could be added. 42 This, the court concluded, showed that the FAA
43
was never intended to apply to employment contracts "of any sort."'
The court then criticized the approaches taken by other courts holding that
the exemption extends only to transportation workers. Many courts, it noted,
focused on Section 1, the exemption provision, instead of Section 2, the
coverage provision."4 Section 1 extends the exemption only to the employees
over which Congress actually then had power under the Commerce Clause. 141
The court stated that "[r]eading § 2 and § 1 together... demonstrates that
Congress did not intend for the FAA to apply to any employment contracts
.... Other circuits (and the dissent here) have refused to follow that approach,
which is why they have reached the wrong result."'" The court also criticized

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Craft, 177 F.3d at 1086.
Id. at 1087.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
Craft, 177 F.3d at 1087.
Id.
Id. at 1089.
Id.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092.
Id. (citation omitted).
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those courts for relying on the distinction between "in commerce" as used in
Section 1, and "involving commerce," as used in Section 2' by stating that
"[c]ourts that have made these kinds of textual distinctions have relied entirely
on post-New Deal cases" that were decided after Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause was expanded by the Supreme Court.'48
In conclusion, the majority stated thaf courts applying Congress' full
commerce power to Section 2 of the FAA, while not similarly extending the
exemption for employment contracts contained in Section 1, created a
"disharmony" between the two provisions that "did not exist when Congress
enacted the FAA."' 49 Because the court found all employment contracts exempt
from the FAA, it held that it was without jurisdiction to hear Campbell Soup's
interlocutory appeal. 0
In his dissent, Judge Brunetti noted that the majority's holding went against
the "great weight" of circuit authority.'
The dissent argued that the plain
language of Section 1 was clear in limiting the exemption to transportation
workers, and that, because the language was clear, the majority's "rather
complex exercise in statutory interpretation" was in error.'52 Furthermore, the
dissent argued, the majority's reading violated the "cardinal principle" of
statutory construction that a court should give effect to every clause and word
ofa statute. 53 Extending the exemption to all employment contracts was in error
because it robbed the inclusion of "seamen and railroad employees" of any
54
meaning.
Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit applied its Craft holding in CircuitCity
Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed 55 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. 6 The appeal
from the latter decision finally brought the issue to the Supreme Court.

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1092-93.
Id. at 1093.
Id.
Id. at 1094.

151. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).

152. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173

(1997)).
154. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
155. 195 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated, 532 U.S. 938 (2001).
156. 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FAA

IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
5 7 a majority of the Supreme
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,"
Court
held that Section I of the FAA exempts only the contracts of employment of
transportation workers from the provisions ofthe Act.1" 8 The majoritybegan its
analysis by noting that all but one of the federal courts of appeals had reached
that conclusion, while the Ninth Circuit adopted a different approach exempting
all contracts of employment as "beyond the FAA's reach, whether or not the

worker is engaged in transportation.'

'5 9

The Court first referred to several of its earlier decisions considering the
FAA. InPrimaPaintCorp. v. Flood& Conklin ManufacturingCo., 6" the Court
concluded that the FAA was enacted pursuant to Congress' substantive power
to regulate interstate commerce and admiralty.,' In Southland Corp. v.
6 2 the Court held that the FAA
Keating,1
created substantive federal law that was
applicable in both state and federal courts and preempted state laws hostile to
arbitration.'63 In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,'" the Court held that
the use of "involving commerce" in Section 2 of the FAA evidenced an intent
by Congress to "exercise [its] commerce power to the full."'
Tuningto Adams' arguments, the Court addressed Adams' contention that,
regardless of the breadth of the Section 1 exemption, an employment contract
was not within Section 2 of the Act," the coverage provision, because an
employment contract was not a "contract evidencing a transaction involving

157. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). Justice Kennedy authored the opinion, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Id. at 107.
158. Id. at 119.
159. Id. at 109.
160. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
161. Id. at 405.
162. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
163. Id. at 16.
164. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
165. Id. at 277.
166. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Section 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a

transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
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interstate commerce.'" 67 The Court rejected this argument, saying that such an
interpretation would make the Section 1 exclusion "pointless."' 68 Therefore, the
Court concluded that if arbitration agreements in employment contracts were to
be excluded from the FAA, it would have to be under Section 1.169
Turning to Section 1, the Court considered Adams' argument that the
Section 1 exemption should reach to the full extent ofthe Commerce power, and,
thus, exempt all contracts of employment. 70 Adams argued that Section 1 and
Section 2 were "coterminous," with Section 2 extending the FAA's coverage to
all employment contracts within the Commerce power, and the language of
Section 1, "engaged in ...
commerce," then exempting all ofthose employment
contracts. 7 ' This argument, however, ran into "an immediate, and in [the
Court's] view, insurmountable textual obstacle."' 72 Unlike "involving
commerce" in Section 2, the Court reasoned, "any other class of workers
engaged in... commerce" was a residual phrase following the express terms
"seamen" and "railroad employees."' 73 Interpreting"engaged... in commerce"
to exclude all employment contracts from the FAA would not "give independent
effect" to the inclusion of "seamen" and "railroad employees" and would make
the inclusion of those specific categories unnecessary. 7 4 Thus, like the court in
Tenney, the majority concluded that the Section 1 exemption was to be
interpreted under the ejusdem generis canon.' As a result, the Court found that
the meaning of the residual clause was controlled by reference to the categories
of workers referred to just before it, and could not extend to all employment
76
contracts.
Futhermore, the Court concluded that even if"engaged in commerce" stood
alone in Section 1, it still would not exclude all contracts of employment from
the FAA.' 7 The Court noted that, unlike "affecting commerce" and "involving
commerce," which indicate a reach to the full extent of the Commerce Clause
power, "in commerce," and specifically "engaged in commerce," have a more

167. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 113-14.
170. Id. at 114.
171. d.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. "The wording of § 1 calls for the application of the maxim ejusdem
generis, the statutory canon that '[w]here general words follow specific words in a
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar
in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words."' Id. at 114-15.
176. Id. at 115.
177. d.
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limited reach.' Referring to its decision in Allied-Bruce, the Court stated that
the words "in commerce" were "words of art" which did not express a
congressional intent to legislate to the full extent of its Commerce Clause
79
authority.
The Court also disagreed with the argument that "engaged in commerce"
should be read differently in the present case because the FAA was enacted
when the Commerce Clause power was narrower that it is today. 8 ' Adams
argued that in 1925, "engaged in commerce" would have approached the outer
limits of the Commerce Clause power."' The Court rejected this argument,
saying that it would contradict earlier cases "and bring instability to statutory
interpretation."'8 In support of its decision, the Court noted other cases where
it had declined to read "engaged in commerce" differently where the phrase was
used in a statute predating the expansion of the Commerce Clause power." "It
would be unwieldy," the Court stated, "for Congress, for the Court, and for
litigants to be required to deconstruct statutory Commerce Clause phrases
depending upon the year ofaparticular statutory enactment.""' While the Court
recognized that statutory jurisdictional formulations do not always have a
uniform meaning whenever used by Congress, it stated that a narrow reading of
the Section 1 exemption was supported by the statutory context in which it was
found and also by the FAA's purpose.'85
After noting that a narrow reading of Section 1 was directed by the text of
the FAA itself,thus obviating the need for reference to the legislative history, the
Court noted that, in any case, that history was sparse and what did exist was not
persuasive. 6 The Court referred to the testimony of Andrew Furuseth, the
president of the International Seamen's Union of America, before a Senate
subcommittee hearing, objecting to the FAA. 8 Noting the problematic nature
of such history, the Court stated that it "ought not attribute to Congress an

178. Id.
179. Id. at 115-16.
180. Id. at 116-17.
181. Id. at 116.
182. Id. at 117.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 118.
185. Id. at 118-19.
186. Id. at 119-20.
187. Id. Supporters of abroad reading of the Section 1 exemption frequently rely
on this testimony. See id. at 126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also David E. Feller,
Putting Gilmer Where it Belongs: The FAA's LaborExemption, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 253, 262-63 (2000); Finkin, supranote 110, at 291-92.
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official purpose based on the motives of a particular group that lobbied for or
against a certain proposal."' 8
The Court also rejected Adams' argument that a narrow reading of Section
1 would attribute an "irrational intent" to Congress by exempting the
employment contracts of those workers most clearly within the Commerce
Clause power in 1925, while extending the Act's coverage to employment
contracts which were not as directly connected with interstate commerce and
thus less certain to be within the Commerce Clause power as it then existed." 9
The Court saw "no paradox" in this reading, concluding that it was a permissible
inference that Congress would exclude transportation workers from the FAA
because of its "undoubted authority" to enact statutes specific to those groups.'
Specifically, the Court noted that when the FAA was enacted, federal legislation
already provided for the arbitration of disputes between seamen and their
employers and that, at that time, grievance procedures were in place for railroad
employees, with a statute calling for arbitration and mediation of those disputes
forthcoming.' 9 ' The Court stated that it was reasonable to assume that Congress
did not want to disturb those procedures and that was the reason Congress
exempted those workers from the FAA. 92 The further exclusion of "any other
class ofworkers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," the Court reasoned,
could exhibit Congress' intent that the FAA cover workers in general while
allowing for specific legislation for transportation workers. 93
The Court noted the arguments of "[v]arious amici,including the attorneys
general of 22 States" that a narrow reading of Section 1 would pre-empt state
laws limiting the use of arbitration agreements in employment contracts, thus
intruding upon the States' "traditional role in regulating employment
relationships."' 94 The Court stated that this argument was better directed at
Southland Corp. v. Keating,'95 in which the court held that the FAA applied in
state court and pre-empted state law.9 6 The Court also noted that it had recently
reconsidered that issue in Allied-Bruce and had chosen not to overrule it. 97
The majority concluded its analysis by pointing to the benefits ofarbitration
of disputes and noting its prior rejection of the idea that those benefits were not

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 120.

Id.
Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 121-22.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 122.

Id.
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present in the employment context.'98 One ofthe benefits discussed by the Court
is avoiding the costs of litigation, a fact which the Court noted was particularly
important in employment disputes, due to the typically smaller amounts of
money involved as compared to commercial disputes as well as the problems
presented by choice-of-law issues in the context of employment disputes.'"
Further, the Court found that the enforcement of arbitration was acceptable
because it would not conflict with the policies of federal anti-discrimination
statutes. 2" Quoting familiar language from MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,2 1 the Court stated that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
2 02

forum.1)

Relying on the ejusdem generis construction, and averring to the FAA's
purpose to overcome the hostility of the courts toward agreements to arbitrate,
the Court concluded that the text of the FAA foreclosed the Ninth Circuit's
broad reading exempting all contracts of employment.2 3
While it is of course possible to speculate that Congress might have
chosen a different jurisdictional formulation had it known that the
Court would soon embrace a less restrictive reading of the Commerce
Clause, the text of § 1 precludes interpreting the exclusion provision
to defeat the language of § 2 as to all employment contracts. Section
1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of
transportation workers. 2°

198. Id. at 122-23.
199. Id. at 123.
200. Id.
201. 473 U.S. 614,628 (1985).
202. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 123.
203. Id. at 119.

204. Id. Circuit City's success at enforcing the agreement to arbitrate was shortlived. On remand, the Ninth Circuit found the "Dispute Resolution Agreement"between
Circuit City and Adams an unconscionable contract of adhesion and, therefore,
unenforceable under California law. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889,
892-95 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2329 (2002). Citing the Supreme Court's
decision in Allied-Bruce, the court offered that "[tihe FAA was enacted to overcome
courts' reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements." Id. at 892 (citing Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,270 (1995)). The court noted, however, that the
FAA, while providing that agreements to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable," allows for general contract defenses such as fraud, duress and
unconscionability against such agreements. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. §2 (2000)). The court
explained the California test for unconscionability as one determining whether the
contract is bothprocedurallyunconscionable (considering "the equilibrium ofbargaining
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B. Justice Stevens' Dissent
In his dissent,"' Justice Stevens criticized the majority's "heavy reliance"
on the courts of appeals decisions in the decade before Circuit City.2"6 Noting
the phrases "maritime transaction" and "contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce," Justice Stevens remarked, "were [the court] writing on a
clean slate, there would be good reason to conclude that neither... phrase...
was intended to encompass employment contracts."2 7 Justice Stevens argued
that the history of the FAA clearly showed that its purpose was simply to provide
for the enforcement of arbitration provisions in commercial and admiralty
contracts.2"' Nothing in the history of the Act's drafting by the American Bar
Association or the congressional records contained any. evidence that it was
intended to apply to employment contracts," 9 and despite references to the bill
describing it as applying only to "commercial contracts" and "business men,"2 '
organized labor opposed its original version.2 ' Specifically, Justice Stevens
referred to the objections of Andrew Furuseth, the president of the International
Seamen's Union of America. In response to these objections, the chairman of

power between the parties and the extent to which the contract clearly discloses its
terms") and substantively unconscionable (whether "the terms of the contract are unduly
harsh or oppressive"). Id. at 893.
Finding the contract procedurally unconscionable, the court noted that the Dispute
Resolution Agreement was a standard-form contract "drafted by the party with superior
bargaining power." Id. The court also found the contract substantively unconscionable,
noting that the agreement did not allow recovery of damages to the extent otherwise
available, and that the agreement, while requiring employees to arbitrate any
employment-related disputes with Circuit City, did not require Circuit City to arbitrate
any claims it might make against its employees. Id. at 893-94. The Ninth Circuit
referred to a California Supreme Court case considering a similar contract in which it had
held that some "modicum of bilaterality" was required. Id. at 894 (quoting Armendariz
v. Found. Health Pschycare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669,692 (Cal. 2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Because it could not sever the objectionable provisions without
"rewriting" the Dispute Resolution Agreement, the Ninth Circuit found "the entire
arbitration agreement unenforceable" and again reversed the district court's order
compelling arbitration. Id. at 896.
205. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by
Justices Ginsberg and Breyer; joined in part by Justice Souter).
206. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 126 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Id. The majority also addressed Furuseth's objections but did not find them
persuasive. See supra notes 187-88.
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the ABA committee that drafted the bill and Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover both suggested that Congress adopt language identical to the nowexisting exemption language in Section 1l3
Justice Stevens argued that this history showed the FAA was not intended
to apply to employment contracts.2" 4 Thus, it was "ironic" that the majority used
the exemption clause as a basis to include employment contracts within the
FAA's coverage.2" 5 While the majority said that the Section 1 exemption would
be "pointless" if Section 2 did not bring employment contracts within the FAA's
coverage at all, Justice Stevens argued that it was "not 'pointless' to adopt a
clarifying amendment in order to eliminate opposition" to the bill. 2' 6 Further,
Justice Stevens stated that the majority's broad reading of Section 2 was
incongruous with its narrow reading of Section 1.217
Justice Stevens noted that the early courts of appeals decisions generally
assumed that all contracts of employment were intended to be excluded from the
FAA.21 8 The narrow reading was not adopted until 1954, by the Tenney court.219
Furthermore, when the Supreme Court inLincoln Mills2 ° ruled that Section 301
of the Labor and Management Relations Act granted the authority to compel
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement, its failure to rely on the FAA
for that authority implied that the Court did not think that the FAA applied to
employment contracts." Justice Stevens noted Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion in Lincoln Mills which explicitly said so. 2
Justice Stevens also criticized the Court's recent cases, which he felt went
beyond overcoming judicial prejudice and instead pushed "the pendulum far
beyond a neutral attitude and endorsed a policy that strongly favors private
arbitration." 2" Thus, when the Court pointed to the recent decisions of the
courts of appeals holding that Section 1 should be given a narrow reading, the
Court was "standing on its own shoulders."

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 129-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 130-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 131-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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C. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter 2 began by stating that there were two ways of reading
Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA."2 The first would read the language only as it
would have been understood in 1925 when the FAA was enacted. 7 This
reading, according to Justice Souter, would "result in a statutory ambit frozen in
time, behooving Congress to amend the statute whenever it desired to expand
arbitration clause enforcement beyond its scope in 1925. " 8 The second
approach would be to read the language in a manner consistent with the modem
conception of the Commerce Clause power. 9 This approach would produce an
"elastic reach," understanding that Congress would have wanted to go as far as
it could, "whatever that might be over time.""2 Justice Souter stated that the
Court applied such an elastic reading to Section 2 in Allied-Bruce, holding that
Section 2 reached to the full extent of the modem Commerce Clause power."
Thus, the issue was whether Section 1 should be given "a correspondingly
evolutionary reading, so as to expand the exemption for employment contracts
to keep pace with the enhanced reach of the general enforceability provision." 2
While such an elastic approach seemed the natural result to Justice Souter, he
noted that most of the courts of appeals and the majority had decided to the
contrary.

233

Justice Souter stated that a broad reading of the Section 1 exemption faced
only "two hurdles," neither of which was a bar.? The first was the difference
between "engaged in commerce" in Section 1, and "involving commerce" in
Section 2 .s When Congress passed the FAA, the only employees over which
Congress had Commerce Clause power were those employees actually engaged
in interstate commerce, such as transportation employees." 3
Thus, by using "engaged in" for the exclusion, Congress showed an
intent to exclude to the limit of its power to cover employment

225. Id. at 133 (Souter, J., dissenting) joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsberg, and
Breyer).
226. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
228. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting).
231. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting).
235. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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contracts in the first place, and it did so just as clearly as its use of
"involving commerce" showed its intent to legislate to the hilt over
commercial contracts at a more general level."
Furthermore, Justice Souter continued, none of the cases relied on by the
majority when it concluded that "engaged in" directed a narrow reading of the
exemption "dealt with the question here, whether exemption language is to be
read as petrified when coverage language is read to grow." 8
The second hurdle Justice Souter recognized was the inclusion of "any
other class of workers engaged in... commerce" after the specific inclusion of
"seamen" and "railroad employees," to which the majority had applied ejusdem
generis.? 9 Justice Souter stated that ejusdem generis is only a fallback, however,
and that where, as in the present case, there were good reasons to, it should be
ignored.2' Justice Souter also addressed the majority's reliance on the fact that
Congress excluded the employment contracts of those groups of workers over
which it had already enacted legislation.24' According to Justice Souter, "the
explanation for the catchall is not ejusdem generis; instead, the explanation for
24
the specifics is ex abundanticautela,abundance of caution.""
V. COMMENT
When the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Section
1 of the Federal Arbitration Act exempts from the Act only the contracts of
employment oftransportation workers, the Court did not adopt a new or unique
rule. Instead, the Court merely approved the approach adopted by ten of the
eleven circuit courts of appeals to reach the issue and which dates back to
1954.243 Given the overwhelming weight of authority in favor of the majority's
holding (even the Ninth Circuit, the only court of appeals to hold otherwise, was
split 2-1 with the dissent arguing for the rule adopted by the majority in the
instant case), it is perhaps surprising that the Supreme Court decided the issue
on as close a vote as it did, the Court splitting 5-4. On the other hand, given the
strong arguments available to both sides of the debate, perhaps a close decision
should have been expected.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 137 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 137-38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 139 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 140 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am.,

Local 437, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
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The problem in interpreting Section 1, however, arises not from the
language ofthe FAA, but from the Supreme Court's expansion ofthe Commerce
Clause power in the years following the FAA's enactment." When Congress
passed the FAA, its Commerce Clause power was limited to the traditional
understanding of "commerce," which meant the exchange of goods and services
through buying, selling and bartering, and transportation related thereto.245
Likewise, Congress' Commerce Clause power over employment relationships
extended only to workers actually engaged in interstate commerce, that is,
transportation workers.2 ' Even supporters of a broad interpretation accept this
24 7

fact.

Given that at the time of the FAA's passage Congress knew it only had the
power under the Commerce Clause to reach employees such as seamen, railroad
workers, and other workers engaged in transportation, the exclusion in Section
1 seems clear; only that category of employees was exempted from the Act.
Thus, the majority's use of ejusdem generis produces the reading of the
exclusion most consistent with the extent ofCongress' Commerce Clause power
when it enacted the FAA. It seems unreasonable that Congress would try to
extend an exemption to employment contracts over which it had no reach.24'
Further, reading the phrase to exempt all employment contracts produces a
reading that is essentially "seamen, railroad employees, or everyone else."
Obviously, clearer language would have been "all contracts of employment" had
Congress in fact wanted to be sure to exclude all contracts of employment.
Because Congress could have used clear language to exclude all employment
contracts but did not do so, the more appropriate reading is that Congress
intended the exclusion to apply only to transportation workers, with "any other

244. Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) with United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
245. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-87 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). "Commerce" has also been defined by comparison to activities which are
not "commerce," particularly manufacturing and agriculture, even though those activities
produce goods which are ultimately exchanged in commerce. See id. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY defines "commerce" as "[t]he exchange of goods and services, esp. on a
large scale involving transportation between cities, states, and nations." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 263 (7th ed. 1999).
246. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting).
247. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d
1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999); Finkin, Employment Contracts Under the
FAA-Reconsidered, 48 LAB. L.J. 329, 331-33 (1997).
248. This creates a problem for those supporting a narrow reading of Section 1 as
well. The coverage provision, Section 2, reaches all employment contracts only after the
Court expanded the Commerce Clause power. Thus, Congress would not need to have
exempted those contracts had it wanted to because they would not have fallen within the

Act's coverage in the first place. See supratext accompanying notes 180-85.
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class of workers engaged in... commerce" merely rounding out the category,
of which seamen and railroad employees were the principal parts.
The majority, however, fails to reconcile or explain its broad reading of
Section 2 as approved in Allied-Bruce,249 with its narrow reading of Section 1.
If the Commerce Clause power extended only to the employment contracts of
transportation workers, then it would not have beennecessary to exempt all other
employment contracts from the FAA had that been Congress' intent. The
majority's suggestion that seamen and railroad employees were exempted
because specific legislation had already been enacted regarding them is not very
convincing and wholly fails to address the residual "any other class of workers
engaged in... commerce," which is the root of the problem in the first place.10
But the need to reconcile the two sections only arises from the Court's
expansion of federal power under the Commerce Clause in ways that the 1925
Congress could not have expected. Whereas the meaning of "involving
commerce" in Section 2 could be, and was, expanded without obvious problem
or contradiction, the restrictive language used in Section 1, which should create
no problem when the entire Act is interpreted in light of the Commerce power
as it was understood to be when the Act was written, created the issue decided
by the Court. Unlike Section 2, which simply used "involving commerce," the
express language of Section 1 recognized Congress' limited power under the
Commerce Clause in 1925 by enumerating the specific types of employees over
which Congress' power reached-transportation workers such as seamen and
railroad employees."' In contrast, Section 2 simply uses the phrase "involving
commerce," without delineating the term by making specific references such as
"the selling and buying of goods or services" or "the transportation of goods." ' 2
So while Section 2 was susceptible to expansion by the Court and maintained a

249. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
250. Judge Posner explained in Pryner that motor carriers were generally the
remaining transportation workers after seamen and railroad employees and that they
would soon also be federally regulated. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354,
358-59 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 912 (1997).
251. One can imagine that Congress could have simply excluded "all contracts of
employment of workers engaged in commerce," which would more clearly suggest that
all employment contracts were excluded. This would of course still run into the
argument that "engaged in" reflects a more restricted assertion of Commerce Clause
power than "involving commerce." See supranotes 161-63.
252. Section 1 defines "commerce" as "commerce among the several States orwith
foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia,
orbetween any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State
or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or
foreign nation." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). This does little to explain what "commerce" is
other than stating between which bodies it takes place.
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clear meaning, Section 1 did not. The problem is not in the language, but in the
great expansion of the Commerce Clause power from the 1930s forward.' 3
One solution to the problem, arguably adopted by the majority, is to apply
the 1925 meaning rather than the "modem" meaning to "commerce" in the
Section 1 exemption, thus clearly limiting the exemption to transportation
workers. This approach gives the most coherent reading to the exemption and
recognizes the FAA's policy favoring the arbitration of disputes. One author has
said that Judge Posner in Pryner24 essentially adopted this approach. 55 The
author wrote that the approach had "candor" although it was lacking in
"principle." This approach, however, is no more lacking in principle than is
extending the overall scope of the FAA beyond anything the 1925 Congress
reasonably could have imagined while construing Section I to give it a meaning
it certainly didnothave in 1925. Limiting the Section 1 exclusion to
transportation workers, and thereby allowing for the specific enforcement of
arbitration agreements in all other employment contracts, also accords best with
the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence favoring arbitration.256 Beginning with
its opinion in Moses H. Cohn Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp., 7 the Court has held that the FAA created a body of federal substantive
law" 8 that pre-empts state law," 9 including state laws which in any way do not
place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts." 260 The
Court has further held that the FAA's coverage extends to the limits of
Congress' Commerce Clause powe' 6' and that statutory claims are fully
arbitrable unless Congress has evinced an intention otherwise. 6 2 The Court
clearly gives strong approval to agreements to arbitrate. Given the Court's

253. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas noted that when "[w]hen asked at oral argument [in that
case] if there were any limits to the Commerce Clause, the Government was at a loss for
words.... Likewise, the principal dissent insists that there are limits, but it cannot
muster even one example." Id. at 600.
254. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 912 (1997).
255. Finkin, supra note 247, at 334.
256. For a review of that jurisprudence, see generally Stephen L. Hayford,
CommercialArbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea Change, 31 WAKE
FORnSTL. REV. 1 (1996).
257. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
258. Id. at 24.
259. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
260. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
261. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995).
262. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
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expansive reading of the FAA,2 63 the Court's decision to include most
employment contracts within the Act's coverage produces the result most
consistent with that approval.
Beyond being consistent with the Court's recent decisions regarding the
FAA, the Court's decision in Circuit City has the potential of considerable
benefit to overburdened federal courts and, more importantly, to employers and
employees. Arbitration would lessen the burden on an already strained federal
court system. Employment litigation is currently a "growth industry."" During
the 1980s and 1990s, employment litigation increased by four hundred
percent.26 Between 1991 and 1995, employment-related civil rights lawsuits
increased by 128%.'" Employment-related cases are estimated to occupy ten to
twenty percent of the federal district court dockets. 6 7 Furthermore, once an
employment-related civil rights case is on a federal district court docket, the
court can expect it to be there, as a median, for slightly less than two years.268
Arbitration of many of these disputes could lessen the log-jam of cases in an
already strained court system and free up resources to consider other problems.
Employers also stand to benefit from arbitration of employment disputes,
a fact which many employers appear to have recognized in the last ten years.
Eight to ten percent of employees in the United States are parties to binding
arbitration agreements, eighty-five percent of which have become so since the
Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.269
The most obvious reason for employers to implement arbitration programs is to
avoid the costs associated with litigation of disputes with their employees.
Defending a suit, whatever its merits, can cost an employer hundreds of
thousands of dollars.270 Simply filling out paperwork for an investigatory agency
when an employee files a complaint can cost thousands of dollars in attorney's
263. Professor Jean Sternlight argues that the Court's reliance on the FAA for its
broad support of binding arbitration is in error and goes far beyond Congress' intent in
drafting the Act. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunkingthe Supreme Court'sPreferencefor BindingArbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
637 (1996).
264. Sherwyn, supra note 29,at 76-77.
265. Stuart H. Bompey, Michael Delikat & Lisa K. McClelland, The Attack on
Arbitration andMediation of Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 21 (1997).
266. Id. at 22.
267. Id. (ten percent). Jay S. Siegel, ChangingPublicPolicy:PrivateArbitration
to Resolve StatutoryEmploymentDisputes, 13 LAB.LAW. 87,87 (1997) (twenty percent).
268. Lewis L. Maltby, PrivateJustice: Employment Arbitrationand Civil Rights,
30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 29, 55 (1998).
269. 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see David E. Feller, Putting Gilmer Where it Belongs:
The FAA 's LaborExemption, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 253,253 (2000).
270. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The ChangingRole of LaborArbitration,76 IND.
L.J. 83, 92 (2001).
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fees.27' Employers who lose a case can expect to pay considerable damages,
possibly including punitive damages in the millions.272 Whereas an employee's
damage award in a discrimination case at one time generally consisted only of
backpay, thus promoting settlement, many employees now pursue a case hoping
to win a large punitive damages award. 3 Even where an employee's allegations
appear to be frivolous, the relative ease with which an employee can file a
complaint with an investigative organization such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), as compared to the employer's costs in
answering such a claim, can lead employers simply to settle meritless claims
rather than try to defend them. This has aptly been referred to as "de facto
274
severance."
Little wonder then that employers would look for an alternative to litigation.
Arbitration is generally cheaper than litigation, a fact aided by typically limited
discovery and motions. Arbitration is also less formal than full-blown litigation
and arbitration cases are typically resolved more quickly and confidentially than
those that are litigated.27
Arbitrating disputes rather than litigating them can be advantageous for
employees as well. The EEOC, charged with protecting employees from
discrimination, is overwhelmed with complaints, the majority of which it will not
be able to actively pursue on an employee's behalf. Because most employees
cannot afford to pursue their claims in court, they must hope to find plaintiff's
attorneys willing to take cases on contingency. As a matter of economics, most
employees will not be able to find such representation. Those who do may be
fortunate enough to win a large damages award, but the losers and those who are
unable to find an attorney willing to take their case, whatever the merits, will get
nothing. Arbitration could provide relief for many of these employees who
otherwise get none.
The EEOC, however, strongly opposes mandatory arbitration of
employment disputes and has openly refused to accept the Court's decision in
Gilmer.276 Given its current inability to deal effectively with the discrimination

271. Sherwyn, supranote 29, at 81.
272. Bompey, supra note 265, at 22 (referring to punitive damage award against
Wal-Mart of $50 million dollars, later reduced by the court).

273. Sherwyn, supranote 29, at 79-80. "[P]laintiffs and their attorneys may turn
down what had once been full relief [backpay] in the hopes of winning the employment
discrimination lottery-an exorbitant jury award." Id. at 80.
274. Sherwyn, supranote 29, at 82.
275. Samuel Estreicher, Saturnsfor Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
PredisputeEmploymentArbitrationAgreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 559,564
(2001).

276. Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27
PEPP. L. REv.1, 2-3 (1999).
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complaints it receives, the EEOC should reconsider its position. Even as the
number of complaints the EEOC receives has increased sharply, the agency's
staffing has decreased.277 The way the agency handles those complaints is cause
for concern. The EEOC no longer investigates every complaint it receives and
when it does investigate, the investigation may last as long as two years before
any action is taken.27 The investigation is normally conducted entirely from a
desk, with the investigator examining documents obtained from the employer
and the employee. 9 A General Accounting Office study found that forty-one
to eighty-two percent of the EEOC's cases were inadequately investigated. 0
Inadequate investigation of complaints could explain why findings of"no cause"
increased from 28.5% of cases closed in 1980 to 61% in 1992.81 If so,
employees with legitimate grievances against their employers are not being
protected.
Further, the number of complaints the EEOC actually resolves on the merits
has declined in each of the past few years. In 1996 for instance, only 9.1% of
cases were resolved on the merits, a figure that includes cases where the
employer agreed to a settlement; 90.8% of employees filing with the EEOC
received neither relief from their employer or a finding of cause. 8 2 Stated
otherwise, they got nothing. Perhaps most startling is how few cases the EEOC
actually files in court on behalf of employees, and the ultimate outcome for the
majority of employees who file claims with the agency. While the EEOC
strongly opposes mandatory arbitration, presumably favoring litigation, it does
little real litigation of its own. In 1994 the EEOC received 173,465 complaints
but filed only 425 lawsuits.233
Moreover, when the EEOC declines to pursue a case and instead issues a
right-to-sue letter, the employee's outlook does not improve. Only ten percent
2s
of employees who receive a right-to-sue letter actually ever file suit in court. 4
The vast majority of workers do not have the resources to pursue a lawsuit so

277. Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claimswith SpecialReferenceto the ThreeA 's-A ccess,A djudication,andA cceptability,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231, 281-82 (1996).

278. Id.
279. Maltby, supra note 268, at 61.

280. Sherwyn, supranote 29, at 86.
281. Sherwyn, supranote 29, at 86. The other possibility is that more and more
employees are filing frivolous claims. If that is the case, employers should not be
burdened with having to answer them.

282. Sherwyn, supranote 29, at 87-88.
283. Maltby, supra note 268, at 62.

284. Maltby, supranote 268, at 60. Of those, 1 in 4 file pro se. Id. "In a complex
adversarial system such as ours, only those who are represented by an attorney have any
reasonable expectation of success." Id.
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they must rely on attorneys willing to take a case on a contingency basis.
Unfortunately, attorneys are driven by economics as much as anyone else, and
they need to be assured of winning enough cases to offset the losses from
unsuccessful cases. Further, the employee's claimed damages must be sufficient
to cover the costs of pursuing the claim in court. As a result, even where an
employee has a very strong case and would likely recover, but has not suffered
sufficient damages, an attorney must decline the case.28 This is especially true
for low wage earners whose damages, while real and pressing for them, cannot
economically justify a costly lawsuit.286 Worst of all, the success rate for
employees who are able to make it all the way to court adjudication is not great.
Of the employment discrimination cases in federal district court in 1994,
employees won an abysmal 14.9% of the time.28
On the other hand, the mean damages awarded to those employees was in
excess of $500,000.88 Mean damages awarded to successful employee
claimants in arbitration cases decided by the American Arbitration Association
from 1993 to 1995 was a mere $49,030; however, employees won in sixty-three
percent of arbitrations. 89 Thus, while awards were typically smaller than in
litigation, employees who arbitrated were far more likely to obtain relief. These
statistics bear out the observation by one author that litigation is a system that
provides "Cadillacs" for the few employees fortunate enough to win large
verdicts while providing "rickshaws" to the many who get nothing."9 A fair
arbitration system could provide reasonable compensation to a greater number
of injured employees while protecting employers from the high costs of
litigation.
Certainly, no one is likely to argue that arbitration of employment disputes
as it now stands is a perfect system, and as the journey is made to a better system
bumps in the road are to be expected. Steps certainly need to be taken to protect
employees from being presented with unfair arbitration agreements, for

285. Lewis Maltby, ParadiseLost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity
forAlternativeDisputeResolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
1, 2-3 (1994).
286. Sherwyn, supranote 29, at 94.

287. Maltby, supra note 268, at 48. As if the low success rate at trial were not
discouraging enough, the record on appeal only makes the picture worse for employees.
A review of federal appellate decisions from 1988 to 1997 showed that employee-

plaintiffs who were successful at trial lost their verdict forty-four percent of the time
when their employer appealed as compared to thirty-three percent for all defendant
appeals. Jess Bravin, U.S. Courts Are Tough on Job-Bias Suits, WALL ST. J., July 16,
2001, at A2.
288. Maltby, supranote 268, at 48.
289. Maltby, supranote 268, at 48.
290. Estreicher, supra note 276, at 563.
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example.29' After all, employees generally need a particular job far more often
than employers need a particular employee. Many other issues remain, such as
who must pay the costs of the arbitration and whether an agreement to arbitrate
can limit an employee's recovery to an amount less than provided in statutes.
None of those concerns, however, change the fact that, given sufficient
safeguards to ensure fairness, arbitration, and other forms of alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") could be of benefit to everyone involved in the employment
relationship.
Congress has apparently considered the benefits of ADR and has included
provisions allowing the use of ADR in two recent civil rights statutes: the
Americans with Disabilities Ace 92 and the 1991 amendments to Title VII of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.293 The Court in Circuit City was, after all,
merely interpreting a statute of Congress, and whatever the Court's opinion,
Congress could have the last word. In fact, a bill was introduced in the House
of Representatives that would have overruled CircuitCity.294 Given the failings
of the EEOC and the costs and problems posed by litigation for all involved,
employers and employees would be better served if the members of Congress,
rather than rejecting a viable alternative to a bad system, embraced arbitration
and focused their legislation on improving that alternative by ensuring fairness
and consistency.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Circuit City, the Supreme Court settled the circuit split regarding the
proper interpretation of Section 1 of the FAA, holding that only the employment
contracts of transportation workers were exempt from the FAA's provisions.
Faced with two possible interpretations, both of which were supported by strong

291. For a case involving such an agreement, see HootersofAm. Inc. v. Phillips,

173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). In very strong language, the court noted the unfairness and
complete one-sidedness of Hooters' arbitration program. Id. at 941. "By promulgating
[a] system of warped rules, Hooters so skewed the process in its favor that Phillips has
been denied arbitration in any meaningful sense of the word." Id.
292. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2000).
293. See Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 118 (reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981). The
Ninth Circuit, however, has interpreted the provision as Congress' intent to prohibit
compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.,
144 F.3d 1182, 1195 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.982 (1998), cert. denied,525

U.S. 996 (1998).
294. See Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act, H.R. 2282, 107th Cong.
(2001). The act would have amended 9 U.S.C. § I by striking "of seamen" and
everything following through "commerce." Id. at §2. The act would also have explicitly
made executory agreements to arbitrate between employees and employers
unenforceable. Id. at § 3.
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arguments, the Court chose the interpretation which accorded most with its
current support of arbitration and which could benefit both employers and
employees. While the Court has made its choice, the debate among courts and
academics as to the proper role of ADR in the employment context will
undoubtedly continue, and Congress might still have the last word on the issue.
Rather than rejecting arbitration out of hand, Congress should consider its merits
as compared to the current system and focus on making arbitration of
employment disputes better, rather than making arbitration of employment
disputes extinct.
B. MATTHEW STRUBLE
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